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MAIN PURPOSE RULE
and other cases applying the vindictiveness standard indicate that
some burdens may be placed on the defendant's right of appeal, but that
acts of the state designed to deter appeals are unconstitutional.
Avis E. BLACK
The Statute of Frauds-Application of the Main Po.pose Rule:
Eliminating a Short Cut Through the "Corporate Veil"
The statute of frauds makes unenforceable the promise of one
person to assume the debt or to guarantee the credit of another unless
the promise or guarantee is supported by a writing signed by the
promisor.1 The chief limitation on this application of the statute is the
so-called "main purpose" or "leading object" rule, which defeats the
operation of the statute when the promisor has a personal pecuniary
interest in the transaction concerned. 2 In Burlington Industries v. Foil3
the North Carolina Supreme Court attempted to clarify what had be-
come a haphazard application of the main purpose rule to oral represen-
tations made by corporate officers, directors, or shareholders concerning
corporate debt. The opinion adhered to the classical standard for appli-
cation of the main purpose rule, rejecting any per se application of the
rule in the context of the close corporation.
The two individual defendants in Burlington, Martin B. Foil, Jr.,
and William H. Taylor, both were officers, directors, and shareholders
in the bankrupt, Colonial Fabrics, Inc., a North Carolina corporation.4
Colonial, a close corporation, 5 was organized in 1970 and achieved a
1. This provision has remained essentially unchanged since the passage of the
original statute of frauds in 1676. The act was originally titled "An Act for the
Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries." 29 CAR. II, c. 3 (1676).
2. A clear statement of the main purpose rule is found in Emerson v. Slater, 63
U.S. (22 How.) 28, 43 (1859):
[Wihenever the main purpose and object of the promisor is not to answer
for another, but to subserve some pecuniary or business purpose of his own,
involving either a benefit to himself, or damage to the other contracting party,
his promise is not within the statute, although it may be in form a promise
to pay the debt of another, and although the performance of it may inci-
dentally have the effect of extinguishing that liability.
This portion of the Emerson opinion is quoted verbatim by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Burlington Indus. v. Foil, 284 N.C. 740, 748, 202 S.E.2d 591, 597 (1974).
3. 284 N.C. 740, 202 S.E.2d 591 (1974).
4. Id. at 741, 202 S.E.2d at 593.
5. Colonial's president, E. B. Fowler, owned one-half of the stock. Defendants
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substantial degree of early success. During this early profitable period a
salesman for Burlington Industries contacted Colonial president E. B.
Fowler fIT, and they reached an agreement, subject to approval by
Burlington's credit department, for the sale of yam to Colonial. Burling-
ton's credit manager, J. H. Barnes, ran into difficulties in obtaining
financial information about Colonial. Although Fowler suggested that
Burlington could obtain Foil's personal guarantee" if credit could not be
extended on the information available, Barnes approved the agreement,
and shipment began without any prior guarantee.
7
As the result of market shifts, Colonial began to experience finan-
cial troubles. This prompted Barnes to contact Foil for the first time,
allegedly receiving assurance that Foil and Tuscarora Cotton Mill, also a
North Carolina corporation in which the individual defendants were
officers, directors, and shareholders, would stand behind Colonial's
credit. Burlington sought the execution of a written agreement guaran-
teeing Colonial's credit; however, Foil and Tuscarora refused. Ship-
ments were halted for a time but then resumed, reportedly on the
strength of further oral representations by Foil.8
The situation deteriorated and, although Colonial made some pay-
ments, its account with Burlington fell behind. During this time Barnes
met with defendant Taylor, who allegedly gave his own personal guar-
antee of Colonial's credit and at one point issued his personal check in
the amount of 25,000 dollars in lieu of a bad check Burlington had
received from ColonialY Colonial went into involuntary bankruptcy in
October 1971 and was at that time in arrears to plaintiff in excess of
55,000 dollars. Plaintiff instituted this action on the alleged oral promise
Foil and Taylor were treasurer and secretary respectively and each owned one-sixth of
the stock with the remaining one-sixth interest being held by Foil's mother. Id. at 741,
743, 202 S.E.2d at 593-94. For various definitions of "close corporations" see 1 F.
O'NArL, CLOSE Coa mOnToNs §§ 1.02, 1.07 (1971).
6. The facts indicate that Burlington's credit manager, Barnes, -knew the defendant
Foil personally and was confident of his financial position. 284 N.C. at 744-46, 202
S.E.2d 594-95.
7. It should be noted that all of the alleged personal guarantees received by the
plaintiff were received after the agreement had been approved and credit extended. This
is a strong indication that the credit was extended to the corporation rather than to the
individual defendants, and that the promises when made were collateral (within the
statute) rather than original (without the statute). Indeed this fact proves to be
determinative as to the court's holding the promises to be collateral. Id. at 754-55, 202
S.E.2d at 601. For discussion and cases on original and collateral promises in the
corporate context, see Annot., 35 'A.L.R.2d 906-(1954).
8. 284 N.C. at 745, 202 S.E.2d at 595.
9. Upon issuance of this personal check, Taylor obtained a written agreement
from Fowler acknowledging a loan in that amount from Taylor to Colonial at six and
one-half percent interest. Id. at 757, 202 S.E.2d at 602.
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of the defendants. Defendants denied the guarantee and affirmatively
pleaded the statute of frauds as a defense. The trial court directed a
verdict for the defendants and the North Carolina Court of Appeals
affirmed. 10 The supreme court, in turn affirming, adhered to the general
principle that for the main purpose rule to apply in this context, the
corporate officers, directors, or shareholders must receive some direct
personal benefit from the transaction over and above the indirect benefit
they receive by virtue of their corporate positions."
The statute of frauds provision relied on by the defendants in
Burlington is virtually identical to section 4 of the original statute of
frauds set forth in the statutes of Charles 11.12 As with other applications
of the statute of frauds, this particular provision of section 4 has raised
questions as to whether it creates more frauds than it prevents. Early
English case law made it clear that, notwithstanding the protection of
section 4, a person deceitfully making oral misrepresentations about the
credit of another would not be protected. 3
Further restriction of the sometimes harsh application of the statute
in this area still seemed necessary. It came by way of a judicial gloss first
articulated by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Nelson v.
Boynton.' 4 The opinion stated what has come to be known as the
10. 19 N.C. App. 172, 198 S.E.2d 194 (1973).
11. 284 N.C. at 749-50, 202 S.E.2d at 598.
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-1 (1965) provides:
Contracts charging representative personally; promise to answer for debt
of another.-No action shall be brought whereby to charge an executor, ad-
ministrator or collector upon a special promise to answer damages out of
his own estate or to charge any defendant upon a special promise to answer
the debt, default or miscarriage of another person, unless the agreement upon
which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof,
shall be in writing, and signed by the party charged therewith or some other
person thereunto by him lawfully authorized.
29 CAR. H, c. 3 § 4 (1676) provides:
[N]o action shall be brought whereby to charge any executor or administrator
upon any special promise, to answer damages out of his own estate; (2) or
whereby to charge the defendant upofn any special promise to answer for the
debt, default or miscarriages of another person; . . . (6) unless the agree-
ment upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note
thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith,
or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized.
The 1828 passage of Lord Tenterden's Act, 9 Gao. IV, c. 14, § 6 (1828), a notable
British modification of § 4 of the statute of frauds enacted for the purpose of
strengthening and broadening its application, has had no effect on North Carolina law,
though it has been adopted in varying degrees by other states. For an illuminating review
of the application of this modification in one state that adopted it, see Taylor, The
Statute of Frauds and Misrepresentations as to the Credit of Third Persons: Should
California Repeal Its Lord Tenterden's Act?, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 603 (1969).
13. Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T.R. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789).
14. 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 396, 37 Am. Dec. 148 (1841).
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leading object or main purpose rule.'5 This approach avoids the statute
of frauds when the promisor, though incidentally guaranteeing or as-
suming the debt of another, acts to gain a personal benefit. Citing
Nelson, the United States Supreme Court applied the main purpose rule
in Emerson v. Slater.6 Emerson has become the primary authority for
application of the rule in the United States,17 and has been cited
extensively by the North Carolina Supreme Court since its first applica-
tion of the rule in 1910.' s
Despite the widespread acceptance of the main purpose rule,
courts have been unwilling to apply it when the interest of the officer,
director, or shareholder involved is no more than a general one in the
success of the corporate venture.' 9 In order for the rule to apply, the
person involved must have some "pecuniary or business purpose of his
own '20 in the transaction, which is additional to and separate from that
of the corporate entity.21 This distinction is conceptually difficult to
draw when dealing with a close corporation. Consequently, courts con-
sidering the applicability of the rule in this context have expressed
contradictory opinions, both in North Carolina 2 and elsewhere.23
In Burlington the court stated that the controlling issue was wheth-
er the main purpose rule was applicable.24 While ultimately refusing to
apply the rule, the decision clearly asserted the continuing validity of the
doctrine in North Carolina law.25 In doing so, however, the court
rejected a per se application of the main purpose rule to close corpora-
tions, distinguishing two of its decisions, Warren v. White20 and May
v. Haynes,27 on which the plaintiff relied. The importance of Burlington
15. Id. at 402, 37 Am. Dec. at 151.
16. 63 U.S. (22 How.) 28, 41 (1859).
17. For other cases upholding the rule see Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 906 (1954).
18. Dale v. Gaither Lumber Co., 152 N.C. 621, 68 S.E. 134 (1910).
19. Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 906 (1954).
20. Emerson v. Slater 63 U.S. (22 How.) 28, 43 (1859).
21. Id.
22. Note, Statute of Frauds-The Main Purpose Doctrine in North Carolina, 13
N.C.L. lRv. 263 (1935).
23. For comment on similar problems resulting from decisions in West Virginia see
Morris, The Leading Purpose Doctrine as Applied to the Statute of Frauds, 62 W. VA.
L. REv. 339, 341-47 (1960). For comment as to the problem generally see Simpson, A
Suggested Test for Application of the Main Purpose Rule Under the Statute of Frauds,
36 CAuLn. L. REv. 405, 411 (1948).
24. 284 N.C. at 749, 202 S.E.2d at 598.
25. Id. at 748, 202 S.E.2d at 597.
26. 251 N.C. 729, 112 S.E.2d 522 (1960). The defendant, sole shareholder of an
automobile dealership, hired a general manager, authorizing him to make certain
expenditures and promising to reimburse him personally if corporate income proved
inadequate.
27. 252 N.C. 583, 114 S.E.2d 271 (1960). The defendant, dominant shareholder in
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lies as much with its handling of these two earlier cases as with its
substantive resolution of the factual arguments presented.
28
The facts presented in Warren and May differ significantly from
those presented in Burlington in two aspects. First, in distinguishing the
two earlier cases, the Burlington court pointed to the virtual sole owner-
ship positions of the defendants in those cases. 29 Although the court in
Burlington refrained from stating that the dominant shareholder posi-
tion of the promisors in the earlier cases was the essential distinction,
there was heavy reliance on this fact in applying the main purpose rule
in Warren3 ° and May."' And the Burlington decision, rejecting the
application of the main purpose rule, did point out the minority share-
holder position of both individual defendants.32 Reliance on the extent
of ownership as the crucial factor leads to a per se application of the
main purpose rule to oral promises by sole or dominant shareholders.
This simple "rule of thumb" approach has been variously asserted and
abandoned by courts in other jurisdictions. 3 This approach necessarily
reduces the limited liability protection afforded by the corporate form to
a sole or dominant shareholder, and in so doing, appears to contradict
state statutory law, 34 which expresses a policy that close corporations,
even with fewer than three shareholders, will be treated the same as
other corporations under the law. If the earlier cases are distinguishable
from Burlington on this ground, then sole or dominant shareholders
should be counseled to pay particular attention to oral comments con-
cerning corporate obligations.
The second potentially important distinction from the earlier cases,
although not explicitly cited by the court in Burlington, is the indication
a development corporation, contracted for painting in a subdivision, telling the painter
that the corporate assets and his personal assets were the same and that he would
guarantee payment on the contract.
28. It is interesting to note that Justice Bobbitt authored both of the earlier
opinions cited and also joined in the court's opinion in Burlington, now as Chief Justice.
29. 284 N.C. at 748, 202 S.E.2d at 597.
30. 251 N.C. at 734-35, 112 S.E.2d at 526.
31. 252 N.C. at 585, 114 S.E.2d at 273.
32. 284 N.C. at 749, 756, 202 S.E.2d at 597, 602.
33. Morris, supra note 23.
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-3.1 (1965) provides:
Effect of acquisition of all shares by less than three persons.-(a) No
provision in this chapter, or in any prior act shall be construed as an indica-
tion of any legislative intention that the existence of a corporation, hereafter
or heretofore formed, is in any respect impaired by the acquisition of all of
the shares by one person or by two persons or that by such acquisition the
corporation ceases to possess any managerial boards or bodies or any capaci-
ties, powers, or authority which it would have possessed with three or more
shareholders, or that upon such acquisition the corporation becomes dormant,
inactive or incapable of acting as a corporation.
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of significant comingling of personal and corporate assets in Warren5
and May, G the very pitfall so carefully avoided by the defendants in
Burlington 7 Such comingling of assets has been cited as a primary
justification for "piercing the corporate veil" and reaching the individual
liability of shareholders. 8 The rationale for imposing personal liability
is that if the shareholders are not treating the corporation as a separate
entity, there is no justification for requiring others to do so. Although
such actions are not uncommon in the context of the close corporation,"0
they are clearly more difficult to maintain than is the simple contract
action relying on the main purpose rule, utilized in Warren and May.40
If either of these two distinctions, or both taken together, deter-
mine the application of the main purpose rule, then the complaining
creditor may be presented with a handy short cut through the "corporate
veil." Rather than attacking what may be an abuse of the corporate
entity41 to secure the shareholder's personal liability, an unscrupulous
creditor may choose to assert falsely the oral personal guarantee of the
shareholder. This possibility is precisely the abuse that section 4 of the
statute of frauds was designed to prevent.42
However, an alternative resolution may exist, given the court's
reliance on Emerson v. Slater4 3 and its special emphasis on the adoption
of the traditional application of the main purpose rule by other authori-
ties.44 Adhering to a strong classical test, the court seemed to overrule
the per se approach of Warren and May. Certainly the court did not
expressly overrule the earlier cases; in fact, the decision clearly pur-
ported to distinguish them.45 However, in light of the statutory mate-
rial cited above46 and the alternative method available for reaching the
same result in the earlier cases, 47 this interpretation may be viable.
35. 251 N.C. at 735, 112 S.E.2d at 526.
36. 252 N.C. at 585, 114 S.E.2d at 273.
37. This is evidenced by defendant Taylor's obtaining of the corporation's promis-
sory note to cover his personal check given to plaintiff in lieu of Colonial's bad check.
See note 8 supra.
38. 1 F. O'NAI, supra note 5, § 1.10.
39. Id. § 1.09a.
40. While the latter action requires little more than an allegation of promise and
appropriate testimony, the former will often rest on records and documents in the control
of the defendant and requiring considerable discovery procedures to reach.
41. For various bases for attack on corporate entity see 1 F. O'NAL, supra note 5.
42. Morris, supra note 23, at 340-41.
43. 284 N.C. at 748, 202 S.E.2d at 597.
44. Id. at 749-50, 202 S.E.2d at 598.
45. Id. at 750-51, 202 S.E.2d at 598-99.
46. See note 32 supra.
47. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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This does not mean that the main purpose rule cannot be invoked in
cases involving close corporations, but only that in order to do so, the
traditional "personal interests" test must be met.
48
Although it is tempting to equate personal and corporate interests
in dealing with a close corporation, especially when all or most of the
shares are held by one person, this should not be done. If these interests
are equated, then the application of the main purpose rule to -avoid the
strictures of the statute of frauds may become virtually automatic. Since,
such an assumption of equality of interests would always provide the
necessary personal pecuniary or business interests required, the share-
holders, officers, or directors in the close corporation might be found to
have assumed personal responsibility for corporate debts because of
careless, unwitting, unintentional, or casual remarks. Neither this result
nor the potential abuse of a per se rule by desperate creditors49 is
desirable, for both seriously reduce the limited liability protection of the
corporate form for a closely held enterprise.
Interpreting Burlington to overrule Warren and May in its applica-
tion of the main purpose rule would leave the creditor with three distinct
methods for reaching a shareholder's personal assets. The first, which is
frequently employed by potential creditors of close corporations, is to
require the written personal guarantee of shareholders before advancing
credit."' The second is the already discussed course of attacking the
corporate entity. The third would be an assertion of the main purpose
rule where, in addition to the alleged oral promise, there is the requisite
"direct and personal" interest cited as necessary by the court in Burling-
ton.51 It is not unreasonable to require a creditor desiring a personal
guarantee in addition to corporate liability to get the guarantee in
writing; nor is it unreasonable to require the creditor who does not take
such action to carry the burden of proving abuse of the corporate entity
in order to reach personal assets upon dissolution. When the corporate
debtor becomes insolvent, the position of the disappointed creditor, who
fails to properly secure personal liability in advance or to gain it through
necessary litigation after the fact, is exactly that of the plaintiff in
48. A good example of the requisite personal interest in a modem context might
occur where a shareholder in a land development corporation also privately owned
property adjacent to that of the corporation. While his oral guarantee of the corpora-
tion's debt would benefit him as a shareholder, it would also benefit him personally to
the extent that the success of the corporation's development efforts would enhance the
value of his adjacent property.
49. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
50. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 5, § 2.03.
51. 284 N.C. at 750, 202 S.E.2d at 598.
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Burlington: at the head of the line for distribution of the remaining
unencumbered assets, but beyond that, subject to the losses which must
sometimes result from the risk of credit extension. The main purpose
rule should offer no more, and indeed as properly applied in Burlington
it does not.
JOHN GARRETT PARKER
